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Dedication:
To my family, without whom I never would have made it to or through this amazing
experience. Thank you for four years of home-cooked freezer meals, seven-hour drives, and latenight calls.
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Abstract
Consumption of video media has changed drastically in recent years. This paper attempts
to analyze consumer choices and provide insight into the direction this industry may go. It
utilizes an overview of relevant literature, a theoretical model, and an empirical study. It
concludes that it is very likely that the industry will ultimately utilize the same bundle formatting
as cable, and that original content and lack of ads are the most important factors in the minds of
consumers. Long term, the industry will likely settle into a relatively similar status quo to the
pre-streaming era.
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Introduction
One of the phenomena of the past decade has been ‘cord-cutting’: eliminating expensive
traditional television subscriptions in favor of cheaper, more convenient online streaming
services. But as the streaming market bloats with more and more competitors, some wonder if it
will not result in a similar product to what consumers were trying to avoid in the first place:
buying huge, pricey ‘bundles’ of services to ensure adequate coverage of desired programs and
eliminate the complexities of keeping track of multiple monthly subscriptions -- even if that
means paying for things they did not want or need. There are a few key differences in the
streaming market: a variety of potential access points, password sharing between friends instead
of following the household-only rules set by the providers, the constant security battle against
piracy, VPNs, and advertisement blockers, all affect the likelihood that streaming will follow the
same path as traditional television. This paper will begin by looking at the differences and
similarities of the two sectors and present the video streaming subscription market thus far, as
well as attempt an analysis of where video streaming subscriptions may go. To further this
analysis, the paper will also present analysis of consumer choices using both a theoretical and
empirical approach.
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Chapter One: Context of the Industry
Streaming is not the first potential competitor to the original cable. Satellite television
also at one point had the potential to shake up the industry, although it is now often put in the
same box as cable by consumers. One model from 2010 concluded that consumers were
generally better off when satellite was introduced to a previously cable-only area, as in order to
compete, cable companies had to improve pricing, quality, or both (Chu, 763). That suggests that
even if streaming moves to a more similar pricing structure to traditional television, consumers
will still ultimately be better off as competition breeds improvement. So far, this does seem to be
the case, as traditional television has been moving more and more towards offering online
companions to their traditional services, such as allowing streaming of certain programs, whether
live or on demand for added convenience. One would also expect to see eventual improvements
in price and quality due to the increased competition, although the magnitude of such
improvements is yet to be determined; quality pressure is also affected by the availability of high
speed internet, another intersecting sector that has been highly influenced by the streaming
market.
Video streaming services are inherently reliant on access to high speed internet and
devices capable of accessing streaming services. While most consumers will already own a
personal computing device capable of accessing this type of service, not all services are available
on PCs, and if consumers want to see their content on a screen as big as the television screens
they are used to, they must invest in another gadget. This may be a cord that connects their
computer to their television, a device that grants a traditional television the ability to access these
services (e.g. a Roku), or even a television with ‘smart’ features built in (e.g. apps and internet
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connectivity). These devices add to the cost of these subscriptions; devices do not last forever,
and even if hardware did not break, software would become outdated. 71% of households in the
US that have broadband own at least one device to aid in accessing these services, but not every
service is available on every device (Top 10). Companies like Amazon, who have both a
subscription service (Prime Video) and an video streaming subscription Entertainment Device
(the Amazon Fire Stick), have an advantage. (Not to mention their built-in platform for selling
said items to consumers.)
Supporting the decision by traditional companies to offer online companions, another
study analyzed factors thought to predict the likelihood of cord-cutting in favor of streaming
services (Tefertiller). While “a variety of gratifications, factors related to technical audience
activity, and media substitution factors” did seem to go into the decision, it was primarily the
“perceived advantages” (not actual advantages, necessarily) over cable that factored in
(Tefertiller). This results ideally in giving consumers the best of both worlds, but also brings up
the question of whether consumers will continue to switch over to streaming as rapidly if they
are faced with an increasingly complex market.
Peacock is one such online companion, being released by NBC/Comcast in April 2020
(Sharma and Flint). Within the next year and a half, it is scheduled to take in some of the most
classic shows to stream, such as The Office (Sharma and Flint). But it also pulls in one of the less
desirable aspects of cable: It will have ads for the consumers who get it for free through their
pre-existing Comcast subscription, and likely even for those who pay a subscription fee to gain
access, although as of November 2019, the company had still not committed to a strategy
(Sharma and Flint). This could be a turning point in the industry. Comcast is a very powerful
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company, one of the first of their kind to majorly delve into the video streaming subscription
industry, and their competitors will likely follow their lead. Thus, the future of these online
companions will rest firmly on Peacock’s shoulders.
One of the biggest advantages most streaming services had over traditional television was
that there was no advertising; the subscription fee was touted as the only cost. Even Hulu, who
was well known at its inception for its advertisement-only option, ended the service in 2016,
showing how the market was tending strongly towards primarily subscription fees (FCC 66). But
as giants such as Netflix and newcomers like Peacock consider adding full-on advertisements
into their business models (having long ago started making use of ‘invisible’ sponsorships within
their original content, allowing brands to pay to have their products heavily visually featured),
how will that affect the market? Since Tefertiller found that perceived advantages were the most
important factor in cord-cutting, we would expect the addition of ad breaks to ultimately have a
very negative impact on the streaming industry versus the dual traditional television with ad
breaks/video streaming without ad breaks mechanism now used by many traditional companies.
Still, ad-based video streaming subscription services are on the rise. In 2018, 24% of US
broadband households accessed ad-based video streaming subscription services, but in 2019,
nearly one third did so (Nason). There are a few different possible explanations for this increase,
the obvious one being that given the amount of money consumers are paying for other video
streaming subscription services, consumers are willing to put up with ads in order to avoid
forking out any more money, and indeed, over half of those who use these services cite no
monthly payment as a key factor in their decision to use the services (Nason). Another
possibility, though, is that many of these consumers may be using an advertisement blocking
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service. These services, usually internet browser ‘add-ons’, are generally free, and are constantly
being updated in attempts to thwart the monetization of consumer attention. It is a constant
battle; at any given moment, either side could be winning, but whenever the other updates, the
balance can shift. At their most successful, ad blockers prevent ads from being shown without
the would-be advertisers even knowing about their own failure.
Piracy is one of, if not the, most stereotypical ways that media companies lose revenue.
But unlike historical, rowdy, ne'er do well pirates, modern media pirates care primarily about
convenience. When streaming services first started, the convenience led to a decrease in the
amount of piracy, but now that there is so much exclusive content across so many different
platforms, piracy is actually resurging because it is impossible for even the best-intentioned
consumers to subscribe to every video streaming service. However, this indicates that while
piracy is an issue, it is probably a better business plan to focus on reaching consumers in the
most convenient way possible; given the historical relationship between piracy and convenience,
we would expect to naturally decrease piracy. If a clear solution to content piracy existed, it
probably would have been discovered by the more traditional media companies who have been
dealing with it since the dawn of the internet, and even, to a lesser extent, with the previous
advent of CD and VHS ripping. Since it is very well documented that piracy and convenience are
correlated, and convenience is a lot more within the control of legal video streaming services
than coming up with a novel solution to a years-old problem, changing the focus away from
piracy as an issue would actually likely have a better effect than directly attacking piracy.
Disney now holds three of the top ten video streaming subscription Video Services spots
according to Parks Associate, as they own Hulu, Disney+, and ESPN (Sharma and Flint). While
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hundreds of streaming services exist, this suggests that the market is not quite as fractured as it
seems. According to The Wall Street Journal, “Americans are willing to spend an average of $44
monthly on streaming video and subscribe to an average of 3.6 services… up roughly $14 from
what most people pay now”, which indicates that there is more room for growth. However, if
many of the major streaming services are owned by the same parent company, e.g. Disney, they
can play around with different pricing structures, such as bundling, to maximize their share of
these $44. Disney has already experimented with bundling using Hulu, one of their subsidiaries,
and Spotify, an unaffiliated music streaming service; they have offered a $5 discount for
bundling to any consumer, and $13 for students (Reisinger). Now that they have so many
streaming services of their own, they can go even further.
Channel surfing is an outdated pastime; today’s consumers want to sit down and watch a
specific thing that they are interested in. According to Parks Associates, the “top three reasons
why consumers would recommend their [video streaming] service are content variety, ease of
content discovery, and good original programming” (Content Variety). While just about every
service offers at least some level of recommendation based on previous viewings, many websites
have also popped up to assist consumers in consuming media via streaming services. One of the
originals, canistreamit.com, was popular primarily before the advent of original programming. It
focused on allowing users to input the title of a TV show or movie and spitting out a list of
places it could be streamed. Now, even the ubiquitous imdb.com has integrated this feature into
its website, and one of the most popular standalone sites is aptly named decider.com: it focuses
on discovering content based on the streaming services that users subscribe to in order to help
them decide what to watch - and where.
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While peer-to-peer recommendations are powerful factors in the decision to subscribe to
a new streaming service, experiencing the service for themselves may be even more so: over half
“of US broadband households that subscribed to an OTT video service within the past year
indicate that the service trial played a key role in their subscription decision” (Free Trial).
Consumers care about their experience, and if they do not like it, they have few qualms about
cancelling. There are nearly three hundred options available; there is no reason to stick with one
that does not meet expectations (Free Trial).
With so many new streaming services launching, subscriber retention is on the minds of
every top executive. The natural place to look for solutions is, of course, the subscriber base
itself. The top five methods that consumers claim would have had them reconsider cancelling an
subscription include a lower price for a service with fewer programs, the ability to put the
subscription on hold, keeping prices frozen to the price the consumer originally agreed to pay, a
complimentary upgrade to a better tier of subscription, or a one dollar per month discount (Parks
Associate 2nd Annual). But there are a few problems with these methods from a company’s
perspective. To begin, simply look to their predecessors, the cable/internet/phone bundle
providers. The standard procedure for many people is to call every single year and threaten to
cancel, scaring their provider into offering a better rate for a period of time. That's a hassle that
streaming companies don’t want to deal with, and as long as there are so many players on the
field, it’s dangerous to have subscribers regularly think about canceling, even if they only say it
to get a better rate. Having a lower price for a service with fewer programs makes perfect sense,
and it is something that is already being tried: Apple’s ‘TV+’ is only $4.99 a month, but is also
starting with a mere nine shows (Sharma and Flint). Compare that to Disney+’s 7,500 TV
episodes and 500 movies for only $6.99 a month (Sharma and Flint). For only two more dollars a
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month, consumers can get, functionally speaking, nearly infinitely more content. Creating
original programming is expensive, so prices can only go so low, but how is it possible to
compete with thousands of hours of beloved programming and competitors with pockets so deep
they don’t even care about making a profit until 2024? (Sharma and Flint) At the end of the day,
it could come down to pure resources. Netflix has the incumbent position with the biggest
subscriber base to draw on and a long headstart on popular original programming, Disney has
multiple successful streaming services with decades of content and a dragon’s hoard of capital…
the stage may already be set. Apple has the advantage of not needing their service to work out, as
it isn’t their core business, but for the dozens of smaller streaming services that are only
streaming services, the next few months are likely to make it or break it. Seventy-two of the
streaming services available in the United States have less than 20,000 subscribers (Percent).
With more and more major players crowding the field, these services are extremely likely to be
crowded out in the next year and a half. If, as mentioned earlier, American consumers are on
average only willing to subscribe to 3.6 video streaming services, the more high profile services
encroach (e.g. Disney+, Peacock, and even Apple TV+ with their brand recognition versus
Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime), the less likely it is that lesser known services will be able to
compete.
Far from giving subscribers the option to put their subscriptions on hold in order to
prevent permanent cancellations, Netflix is actually testing out giving discounts for those willing
to commit to a longer subscription in a single payment: as low as half off if Indian subscribers
commit to a full year (Smith). While it is just in its testing stages, and not yet available in the
United States, it comes on the heels of Disney+ releasing with a similar option, indicating market
pressure (Smith). This approach would guarantee a certain level of revenue for a period of time,
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although given that no one knows where the industry will go in the next year (the longest period
covered by this new deal), it is a gamble that in a year’s time, subscribers will still be happy
enough with the service to pony up a hundred dollars at once to keep it going when they have
countless other options. However, if consumers commit to a couple services, other services may
die before their current subscriptions need to be renewed, limiting competition.
While most streaming services allow others in the same household to have their own
profiles, largely intended to allow couples and children to have unique profiles (which results in
much clearer datasets for companies to analyze in order to provide more personalized
experiences and market analysis), this is often abused by users who share their passwords with
their friends. It is estimated that password sharing costs media giants Netflix $135 million per
month, and Hulu $1.5 billion per year (Hayat). But that’s just in subscription fees; they could be
losing much more in terms of pure data loss. Data is one of the biggest resources available, and
keeping everyone’s information separate allows algorithms to do much more accurate analysis.
Between accounting sharing and piracy, Parks Associates forecasts a loss of over nine
billion dollars in the industry’s revenue overall. They also say that “27% of US broadband
households engage in some form of piracy or account sharing”; this is not a minor issue for
media companies (Forecasts). However, it is also probably not a sign of excessive moral failure
in the US. According to Brett Sappington, a leading researcher in the field, most people who
engage in piracy or account sharing also subscribe to one or more video streaming services; this
indicates that the problem is primarily that media companies are not currently meeting consumer
needs, and that this rate will likely naturally decrease as the industry matures and companies
figure out exactly what consumers want (Park Associates Forecasts).

Video Streaming 12
One method that Netflix has introduced to combat losses due to account sharing is
charging a higher subscription fee to view content on more than one screen at once. Assuming
that many people follow fairly similar viewing habits, such as coming home from work, eating
dinner, then flicking on Netflix, having multiple people on one account would result in a decent
amount of overlap, presumably spurring people to upgrade to a higher tier. While this does not
double the price, so it is less profitable than both parties simply getting their own subscriptions,
Netflix is still getting more than if the ‘leech’ had decided the price of Netflix was not worth it
and thus moved to piracy.
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Chapter Two: Modeling Consumer Choices
Theoretical Modeling
The choices consumers make regarding their subscriptions, while greatly integrated into
the literature review preceding this section, can be summarized and thus represented with a
consumer utility model (see Equation 1 below). Given the abundance of potential outcomes, it is
also a multinomial choice model. Four key factors were chosen for this model: the selection of
content, the convenience of the service, whether or not there were ads, and ‘other’. The goal of
consumers is to maximize the utility of the sum of these four factors for all the services they
choose with respect to the total price not exceeding their budget as the overarching constraint
with (i,j) choices for services.
Equation 1

Empirical Analysis
In order to add in an empirical approach, I created a survey asking about how people
make these choices. They were asked what matters most, how much are they willing to spend,
how many do they actually use or subscribe to? I asked them to rank eleven factors in order of
how much each factor mattered in making their decision. I have summarized these in a table,
along with their corresponding variable names in R Studio.
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Table 1
rprice

Cost

rads

Level of advertisements present

rdifficulty

Ease of use/Convenience

roriginal

Original Content

rmovie

Movie Selection

rbinge

Availability of Binging Classics

radditions

How often new content is added

rsports

Availability of sports

rair

How soon live TV appears

rfriends

Whether friends use the same service

rother

Fill-in-the-blank

In order to make sure there were an adequate number of responses, no demographics
were collected. This did work: over two hundred usable responses were collected. One bias that
is almost certainly present in the data is an increased level of education compared to the general
populous given that the survey primarily received responses from two universities and an
education forum.
The survey also asked about the number of services they used, as well as the number of
services they paid for. I ran a regression model for both of these using the eleven factors as linear
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variables. These models are shown below; a numerical summary of the results can be found in
the appendix.
model1 <- lm_robust(data=surveydata, numused ~ rprice + rdifficulty + roriginal
+ rmovie + rbinge + rads + radditions + rsports + rair + rfriends + rother)
model2 <- lm_robust(data=surveydata, numpaid ~ rprice + rdifficulty + roriginal
+ rmovie + rbinge + rads + radditions + rsports + rair+ rfriends + rother)
As expected, both models found significance. Less expectedly, the presence (or lack
thereof) of original content and ads stood out as the two most important factors, even above
price. This indicates that to stand out in a bloated market, companies should focus on these two
things, and might explain why Netflix has stayed on top and why HBO had such luck. Both
services lack ads and create popular original content.
But decisions don’t happen in a vacuum. Consumers are willing to make trade-offs in
some areas. To improve the model, I added an interaction effect between price and ads:
model3 <- lm_robust(data=surveydata, numpaid ~ rprice*rads + rdifficulty + roriginal
+ rmovie + rbinge + radditions + rsports + rair + rfriends + rother)
model4 <- lm_robust(data=surveydata, numused ~ rprice*rads + rdifficulty + roriginal
+ rmovie + rbinge + radditions + rsports + rair + rfriends + rother)
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When this interaction effect is added, the models fit even better. This appears to be
because there is a correlation between price and advertisements; consumers dislike
advertisements regardless, but the higher the price, the less likely they are to put up with them.
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Conclusion
Only time will tell exactly how this industry will play out; the next year or two will be
key. As consumer needs and desires become better studied, the players already at the top will
have an advantage as they will have a much larger group to learn from. There will likely be a
flurry of different options pop up, ranging from ad-supported to subscription to bundling, and a
combination of consumer preferences and sheer ability to wait the chaos out on the part of the
bigger companies is liable to decide the ultimate surviving pricing structure and streaming
services.
Based on the results of the models in this paper, I suggest that advertisements (at least,
blatant ones) may lose favor until an oligopoly forms of companies that waited out the
competition. Original content and bundling will be two of the most important factors in
determining who survives stage. Ultimately, while the technology has improved, and consumers
will be moderately better off, the industry is unlikely to operate much differently than it did
before the advent of streaming video services.
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Appendix
Model 1

Standard error type:

HC2

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept)
rprice
rdifficulty

4.8412292
-0.0070714
0.0058434

t value Pr(>|t|) CI Lower

CI Upper

3.27681 0.001289

1.92333

7.759131 159

0.05194 -0.13615 0.891875 -0.10965

0.095506 159

0.05153

0.107619 159

1.47742

0.11339 0.909861 -0.09593

DF

roriginal

-0.1518520

0.04121 -3.68515 0.000313 -0.23323 -0.070469 159

rmovie

-0.0185911

0.04661 -0.39885 0.690540 -0.11065

0.073467 159

rbinge

-0.0194359

0.04372 -0.44453 0.657264 -0.10579

0.066916 159

rads

-0.0805367

0.04147 -1.94188 0.053919 -0.16245

0.001374 159

0.04115

1.18241 0.238808 -0.03261

0.129919 159

radditions

0.0486530

rsports

-0.0430407

0.03772 -1.14095 0.255607 -0.11754

0.031463 159

rair

-0.0541616

0.04365 -1.24078 0.216513 -0.14037

0.032049 159

rfriends

-0.0122783

0.04855 -0.25290 0.800671 -0.10816

0.083607 159

rother

-0.0006624

0.02556 -0.02592 0.979357 -0.05114

0.049818 159

Multiple R-squared:

0.1254 ,

Adjusted R-squared:

F-statistic: 2.126 on 11 and 159 DF,

p-value: 0.0213

0.06486

Model 2

Standard error type:

HC2

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error

t value Pr(>|t|) CI Lower CI Upper

DF

(Intercept)

2.9167186

1.99415

1.46264

0.1458 -1.02631

6.85975 138

rprice

0.0569038

0.04985

1.14149

0.2556 -0.04167

0.15547 138

rdifficulty -0.0830026

0.05665 -1.46516

0.1452 -0.19502

0.02901 138

roriginal

0.03649 -2.41597

0.0170 -0.16031 -0.01601 138

-0.0881600

rmovie

0.0161130

0.04435

0.36333

0.7169 -0.07158

0.10380 138

rbinge

0.0093239

0.04464

0.20887

0.8349 -0.07894

0.09759 138

rads

-0.0369342

0.03919 -0.94241

0.3476 -0.11443

0.04056 138

radditions

-0.0165724

0.04085 -0.40566

0.6856 -0.09735

0.06421 138

rsports

-0.0229135

0.04189 -0.54705

0.5852 -0.10573

0.05991 138

rair

-0.0343033

0.04356 -0.78741

0.4324 -0.12044

0.05184 138

0.05742

0.96190

0.3378 -0.05830

0.16876 138

0.03871 -0.01446

0.9885 -0.07710

0.07598 138

rfriends
rother

0.0552288
-0.0005597

Multiple R-squared:

0.1253 ,

Adjusted R-squared:

F-statistic: 2.061 on 11 and 138 DF,

p-value: 0.02711

0.05563

Model 3

Standard error type:

HC2

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error

t value Pr(>|t|) CI Lower CI Upper

DF

(Intercept)

2.9914088

2.02678

1.47594

0.14225 -1.01641

6.99923 137

rprice

0.0232936

0.10499

0.22187

0.82475 -0.18431

0.23090 137

-0.0597585

0.06109 -0.97823

0.32969 -0.18056

0.06104 137

rdifficulty -0.0863238

0.05662 -1.52471

0.12964 -0.19828

0.02563 137

roriginal

0.03657 -2.42385

0.01666 -0.16094 -0.01632 137

rads

-0.0886327

rmovie

0.0137821

0.04508

0.30575

0.76026 -0.07535

0.10292 137

rbinge

0.0085481

0.04512

0.18944

0.85003 -0.08068

0.09778 137

radditions

-0.0189118

0.04273 -0.44259

0.65876 -0.10341

0.06558 137

rsports

-0.0182836

0.04289 -0.42632

0.67054 -0.10309

0.06652 137

rair

-0.0333293

0.04393 -0.75875

0.44931 -0.12019

0.05353 137

0.05790

1.00001

0.31907 -0.05660

0.17240 137

0.03908 -0.01966

0.98434 -0.07804

0.07650 137

0.01729

0.66662 -0.02672

0.04165 137

rfriends
rother
rprice:rads

0.0579036
-0.0007684
0.0074639

Multiple R-squared:

0.127 ,

0.43173

Adjusted R-squared:

F-statistic: 1.989 on 12 and 137 DF,
>

p-value: 0.02959

0.05055

Model 4

Standard error type:

HC2

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept)

4.9443156

1.50937

t value

Pr(>|t|) CI Lower CI Upper

3.27574 0.0012953

DF

1.96316

7.92547 158

rprice

-0.0653140

0.09777 -0.66807 0.5050629 -0.25841

0.12778 158

rads

-0.1202791

0.06969 -1.72581 0.0863372 -0.25793

0.01737 158

0.05283

0.10568 158

rdifficulty

0.0013268

0.02511 0.9799969 -0.10303

roriginal

-0.1511350

0.04102 -3.68468 0.0003142 -0.23215 -0.07012 158

rmovie

-0.0206621

0.04691 -0.44050 0.6601738 -0.11330

0.07198 158

rbinge

-0.0203782

0.04400 -0.46313 0.6439076 -0.10728

0.06653 158

0.04231

1.06634 0.2878980 -0.03845

0.12868 158

radditions

0.0451160

rsports

-0.0337243

0.04026 -0.83766 0.4034877 -0.11324

0.04579 158

rair

-0.0521782

0.04364 -1.19555 0.2336638 -0.13838

0.03402 158

rfriends

-0.0095183

0.04916 -0.19361 0.8467294 -0.10662

0.08758 158

rother

-0.0009639

0.02591 -0.03721 0.9703670 -0.05213

0.05020 158

0.01779

0.04840 158

rprice:rads

0.0132697

Multiple R-squared:

0.1291 ,

0.74610 0.4567139 -0.02186

Adjusted R-squared:

F-statistic: 1.923 on 12 and 158 DF,

p-value: 0.03521

0.06294

David Cook <dac0010@uah.edu>

Fwd: Capstone
Wafa Hakim Orman <who0001@uah.edu>
Wed, May 6, 2020 at 4:17 PM
Reply-To: wafa.orman@uah.edu
To: William Wilkerson <wilkerw@uah.edu>, David Cook <dac0010@uah.edu>, Gabrielle Chivatero <gc0024@uah.edu>
I approve this Honors Capstone project completed by Gabrielle Chivatero.
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